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FORCED MEDICATION OF CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS AND THE UNINTENDED




This Note seeks to analyze the evolution of a criminal defendant's
right to refuse mental health medication, beginning with the expansion
of that right in two of the Supreme Court's seminal decisions in the
area, Washington v. Harper' and Riggins v. Nevada.' The recent
Supreme Court ruling in Sell v. United States3 will be analyzed in depth,
both with regard to its effect on precedent and its impact on future
cases, as the new criteria established by its holding will influence the
behavior of governmental prosecutors seeking involuntary medication.
The Note will explain how the Sell decision strengthened the civil
rights of criminal defendants but also created unintended
consequences for those same persons. For example, allowing a
nondangerous, mentally ill criminal defendant to refuse mental health
medication will often cause him to be incarcerated by the government
for a longer period than if he had been medicated, tried, and found
guilty. 4 Although no clear answer exists to resolve this issue, any
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1. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1989).
2. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
3. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
4. See infra Part IV.
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future Supreme Court decisions in this area must consider this
unintended consequence.
In May 1997 Dr. Charles Sell, a Missouri dentist, was charged in
federal court with making false representations in connection with
payments for health care in violation of federal law.' Sell and his wife
were alleged to have submitted false Medicaid claims in connection
with his dental practice, including false documentation and X-rays.6
Based on these facts, this case appears to be a typical white-collar
crime. However, this case was very different, as Dr. Charles Sell had a
long history of mental illness.'
Shortly after his arrest, Sell was sent for a psychiatric evaluation at
the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield,
8Missouri. After his evaluation, the district court determined that Sell
was competent to stand trial.9 The evaluation report that had been
compiled, however, stated that it was possible Sell would develop a
psychotic episode in the future. l The diagnosis was proven correct less
than six months after Sell was released, when the government sought
to revoke Sell's bond, alleging that he had tried to intimidate a
witness." A warrant was issued for his arrest, and at his initial
appearance before a magistrate judge, Sell's behavior was "out of
control.' ' 12 A revocation hearing was held shortly thereafter in which
Sell's bond was revoked, and he was taken back into custody.13
For the next few months, Sell's trial date was delayed on several
occasions at the request of one party or the other.14 In February 1999
Sell's counsel filed a request for a trial competency hearing, and a
round of examinations followed. 5 By this time Sell's condition had
5. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 562 (8th Cir. 2002). Dr. Sell was
charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1035(a)(2). Id.
6. Id.
7. Sell, 539 U.S. at 169. Sell had been hospitalized for mental illness as far
back as 1982. Id.
8. Sell, 282 F.3d at 562.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 563.
12. Id. Sell "screamed, shouted, and used racial epithets" and when the judge
attempted to proceed despite his behavior, he spit in the judge's face. Id.
13. Sell, 539 U.S. at 170.
14. Sell, 282 F.3d at 563.
15. Id.
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deteriorated greatly; a diagnosis of delusional disorder1 6 was given by
both Sell's psychologist and the government psychologist.1 7 Using this
information, the district court concluded that Sell was incompetent to
stand trial and ordered that he be hospitalized to determine if there
was a substantial probability that Sell would gain the capacity to stand
trial.18
While Sell was hospitalized he was under the care of two
psychiatrists who both determined that he needed anti-psychotic
medication.'9 Their diagnoses were put forth at an administrative
hearing to determine if Sell should be medicated. During that hearing,
Sell stated his desire to the contrary.'o The medical hearing officer
concluded that anti-psychotic medicine was the appropriate treatment
but delayed the administration of the medication until Sell had the
opportunity to appeal."
Sell did appeal the administrative ruling that he be involuntarily
medicated to gain trial competency-from the federal magistrate judge
22to the federal district court, to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
and finally to the United States Supreme Court.23 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari,24 ostensibly to clarify its previous rulings on the right
of criminal defendants to refuse anti-psychotic medication under the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
Part I below will analyze the two Supreme Court decisions that
paved the way with regard to the issue of forcible medication of
16. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS - FOURTH EDITION 296-301 (1994). Delusional disorder is
characterized by the presence of one or more nonbizarre delusions that persist for
at least one month. Id.
17. Sell, 282 F.3d at 563.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 564. Sell testified that he did not want his "chemistry altered." His
personal psychiatrist also stated that anti-psychotic drugs would not help Sell's
condition. Id.
21. Id.
22. Sell, 282 F.3d at 563.
23. Sell, 539 U.S. at 171.
24. See Sell v. United States, 537 U.S. 999 (2002). The Court granted a writ of
certiorari but limited the question to "[w]hether the Court of Appeals erred in
rejecting petitioner's argument that allowing the government to administer anti-
psychotic medication against his will solely to render him competent to stand trial
for non-violent offenses would violate his right under the First, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments" (emphasis added). Id.
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mentally ill criminal defendants. Part II will analyze the holding in Sell
v. United States, explicating the rule announced by the Court as well as
synthesizing that rule with those found in the earlier two decisions.
Part III will use existing Law and Economics scholarship to identify
the goals of the actors involved in the decision to forcibly medicate a
mentally ill criminal defendant. That information will then be applied
to the existing options by which forcible medication can take place,
creating a model to hypothesize the potential effects of the Sell
decision on criminal defendants who are refusing mental health
medication. Part III will then review cases that have used the Sell rule
to determine what its actual effects have been to this point. Finally,
Part IV will explore the unintended consequence of Sell, questioning a
civil rights ruling that may leave many mentally ill criminal defendants
incarcerated for longer than they would have been had they been
medicated, brought to trial, and convicted.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS TO REFUSE
MENTAL HEALTH MEDICATION
We start with first premises: the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment (as applied to the federal government)25 and the
Fourteenth Amendment (as applied to the states) 26 prohibit the
government from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property
without due process of law .. .,2 The word "liberty" and the rights
associated with it have been held to have both procedural and
substantive aspects.28 Through the years, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the Due Process Clause protects a range of activities
from governmental restraint29 to, most importantly for present
purposes, an individual's rights to bodily integrity 3 ° and mental
25. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499-500 (1954).
26. "[N]or shall any State deprive ... ," U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1.
27. Id.
28. See WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, THE CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 137-39 (1992) ("The former [substantive due process] limits
the legal standards or requirements that government may establish in its laws ...
whereas the latter [procedural due process] limits the methods or procedures by
which government enforces its laws . .
29. Id. at 140.
30. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) ("This is conduct that
shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the
struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of
his stomach's contents ....").
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privacy.3 These concepts were applied to two cases which dealt with
involuntary medication of government detainees and created the
framework through which we can more clearly analyze the case of Sell
v. United States.
A. Washington v. Harper
In the case of Washington v. Harper,2 Harper, a mentally ill state
prisoner, filed an action challenging a prison policy that authorized his
involuntary treatment with anti-psychotic drugs without judicial
hearing.33 The Supreme Court held that the policy satisfied both the
procedural and substantive aspects of the Due Process Clause and
allowed the State of Washington to forcibly medicate Harper.
4
Although the prisoner's claim seeking to avoid involuntary medication
for mental illness was denied, Justice Kennedy's opinion laid the
foundation for future claims of this type. The opinion explicitly
granted "liberty interest" status to Harper's interest in "avoiding the
unwanted administration of anti-psychotic drugs under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."35  By granting this
"liberty interest," the Court assured that any government procedure
challenged on these grounds must be justified under some level of
judicial scrutiny. However, the Court held the standard for review for
prison regulations to be a "reasonableness standard," a low level of
judicial review,36 which it easily satisfied.37 This lower level of scrutiny
was deemed to be compelled by the Court's previous decisions
concerning convicted prisoners' holding that an administrative hearing
satisfied procedural due process requirements.39
31. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's
minds.").
32. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1989).
33. Id. at 210.
34. Id. at 236.
35. Id. at 221.
36. Id. at 226. The court used terms such as "rational" government actions
which "further... legitimate objectives." Id.
37. "SOC Policy 600.30 [the prison's policy] is a rational means of furthering
the State's legitimate objectives." Harper, 494 U.S. at 226.
38. "When a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id.
at 224 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1974)).
39. Id. at 225.
2005]
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Although the recognition of this new "liberty interest" seems like a
small step, its existence would also change the government procedures
with regard to all mentally ill persons detained by the state. If a
convicted prisoner had a recognized "liberty interest," a fortiori it must
also extend to all other citizens, including pretrial detainees such as Dr.
Sell. It was not long before the Court was presented the chance to
extend the case law under this "liberty interest" to other areas.
B. Riggins v. Nevada
The case of Riggins v. Nevada4 0 allowed the Court to refine its
understanding of the "liberty interest" in the refusal of anti-psychotic
medication. This time the plaintiff was not a convicted prisoner, but
rather a detainee who wished to stop taking anti-psychotic medication
during his trial.4' The Court granted certiorari to "decide whether
forced administration of anti-psychotic medication during trial violated
rights guaranteed by the... Fourteenth Amendment.,
42
The Court discussed the rationale behind its decision in Harper,
deciding first that persons detained for trial have at least the same
constitutional protections as convicted criminals.43 Moreover, it raised
Harper's "reasonableness" standard," holding instead that the State of
Nevada would have satisfied substantive due process only "if the
prosecution had demonstrated, and the District Court had found, that
treatment with anti-psychotic medication was medically appropriate
and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of
Riggins' own safety or the safety of others., 45 Although some authors
have decried the Court's lack of specific analysis as to the level of
scrutiny46 that was being applied,47 the language quoted clearly
increased the protection of the "liberty interest" at issue for persons
who are merely criminal defendants and thus not convicted criminals
already in the state's care.
48
40. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
41. Id. at 129.
42. Id. at 133.
43. Id. at 133-34.
44. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
45. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
46. Id. at 136.
47. BRUCE J.WINICK, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 201 (1997).
48. Harper, 494 U.S. at 226.
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The Riggins case extended the rule set forth in Harper. However,
strictly speaking, the standard announced in Riggins was couched in
terms that indicate dictum rather than controlling precedent. 49 The
issue of forced medication for trial competency purposes was avoided °
in spite of the fact Riggins had argued that he opposed the anti-
psychotic medication because he believed it would adversely affect his
trial." Over ten years would pass before the Court directly addressed
the question of forced medication of nondangerous criminal
defendants in Sell v. United States.
52
II. SELL V. UNITED STATES EXTENDS THE RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS TO REFUSE ANTI-PSYCHOTIC MEDICATION
Dr. Sell's challenge against the administrative order requiring him to
take anti-psychotic medication was granted certiorari by the Supreme
Court. 3 On its face, the case looked very similar to Harper as both the
administrative order and the affirmance of that order by the magistrate
referred to Sell's dangerousness to himself or others as the basis for
involuntary medication 4 Despite these similarities, the Court quickly
distinguished Dr. Sell's case from Harper.
The Court began its analysis by identifying Harper and Riggins as
the controlling cases in this matter. However, the majority
immediately distinguished the instant case from Harper by declaring
that Sell's case was not based on "dangerousness, 56 but rather on
whether the government should be allowed to involuntarily medicate a
criminal defendant for the purpose of "render[ing] that defendant
49. "Although we have not had occasion to develop substantive standards for
judging forced administration of such drugs in the trial or pretrial settings, Nevada
certainly would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated...
" Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135 (emphasis added).
50. "The question whether a competent criminal defendant may refuse anti-
psychotic medication if cessation of medication would render him incompetent at
trial is not before us." Id. at 136.
51. Id. at 131.
52. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
53. Sell v. United States, 537 U.S. 999 (2002).
54. Sell, 539 U.S. at 183.
55. Id. at 177-78.
56. The dangerousness issue was ignored by the High Court for a procedural
reason, due to the fact that both the district court and the court of appeals held
that the magistrate's order to forcibly medicate Sell based on a determination of
"dangerousness" was clearly erroneous. Id. at 184.
2005]
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competent to stand trial."57 Despite the dismissal of the dangerousness
charge, the court of appeals had upheld the order to medicate Sell for
trial competency purposes based on a three-part test derived from the
Riggins dictum. The Supreme Court also focused on the trial
competency issue and addressed what it felt was the proper method for
the government to authorize such involuntary medication.' 9 In doing
so, it created a test and came to a conclusion, both of which have an
impact on the ability of the government to forcibly medicate criminal
defendants.
A. The Rule of Sell v. United States
The Supreme Court held that the government had in fact violated
Mr. Sell's constitutional right to refuse the administration of anti-
psychotic medication. 60  In its evaluation of the Eighth Circuit's
decision, Justice Breyer drew from Harper and Riggins the standard by
which all decisions of this type are to be made by governmental entities
seeking to forcibly medicate criminal defendants for trial competency
61
purposes:
These two cases, Harper and Riggins, indicate that the
Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to
administer anti-psychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing
serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant
competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically
appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that
may undermine the fairness of the trial, and taking account of
less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further
61important government trial-related interests.
Justice Breyer wrote further to explain what the new standard "says
or fairly implies," 63 perhaps as a guide to future decisions by federal or
state governments in this area. We will examine each of his points in
turn.
He first turned to the notion that a court must find important
governmental interests at stake before it can decide to involuntarily
57. Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
58. Sell, 282 F.3d at 567.
59. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.
60. See id. at 180.
61. Id. at 179.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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medicate a criminal defendant for trial competency.64 Important
interests can be shown when the offense is a "serious crime," either
against persons or property.6 The type and kind of crime will clearly
make a difference when a defendant refuses anti-psychotic medication.
Next, a future court in the same situation must determine that
involuntary medication "will significantly further ... state interests.,
66
In Justice Breyer's words, the court must find that the medication is
"substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand
trial."67 The reviewing court must also find that the medication is
"unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly with the
defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense,
thereby rendering the trial unfair." 68
Third, a reviewing court must determine that involuntary medication
is necessary to further the state's interest.69 This means that any
possible alternative treatments are unlikely to achieve the same results
as anti-psychotic medication.] This part of the test will exacerbate a
continuing debate among mental health professionals, spotlighted by
the amicus briefs filed in the Sell case by the American Psychological
Association and the American Psychiatric Association. In addition to
playing a significant part in the Sell case, the split that exists between
these two mental health associations will affect the way in which the
Sell decision will be implemented in the future. 1
Finally, a reviewing court must decide that the proposed involuntary
medication is medically appropriate, defined as "in the patient's best
interest in light of his medical condition."" This was further clarified
to mean that side effects of various drugs be considered, as well as
their relative levels of success. 3
The Court's opinion went a long way to clarify, in a factual
circumstance it had not dealt with previously, the amount of protection
granted the "liberty interest" in a criminal defendant's refusal to take
anti-psychotic medication. It set up a detailed test by which future
64. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 180.
67. Id.
68. Id. See also Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment).
69. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
70. Id.
71. See infra Parts III.A.1., III.A.2.b.
72. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
73. Id.
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courts can determine whether the government has met its due process
burden when it decides to forcibly medicate a defendant.74 However,
many loose ends still remain. Can the three cases of Harper, Riggins,
and Sell be reconciled? If so, is the result logical and coherent? The
next section seeks to answer those very questions.
B. Judicial Scrutiny of Forced Medication Questions
Harper, Riggins, and Sell are now the benchmarks for determining
the constitutionality of involuntary medication of mentally ill criminal
defendants. 75 The three cases each acknowledge the "liberty interest"
of a criminal defendant or inmate in refusing to be medicated with
anti-psychotic drugs; but, the level of judicial scrutiny changes from
case to case. After analysis, however, these changes can be logically
explained. The Court seeks to grant this liberty interest in the same
proportion that it grants other due process rights, depending on the
factual situation of the person alleging their rights have been
impinged .76
When a court is called to determine whether or not an inmate should
receive anti-psychotic medication involuntarily, the government must
show the medication bears a rational relationship to important
governmental objectives.7 When the person refusing is a criminal
defendant that has not been convicted, they can be forcibly medicated
on either of two grounds: that they are a danger to themselves or
others8 or to restore them to competency for trial 9
The standard by which a "dangerousness" ruling can be defended
was explained in Riggins' dictum, and is probably the best use of the
Riggins ruling in light of the Sell decision. It is that the state "would..
. satisf[y] due process if the prosecution had demonstrated .. .that
treatment with anti-psychotic medication was medically appropriate
and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of
Riggins' own safety or the safety of others.""" The Court declined in
74. See supra Part II.A.
75. See Kathy Swedlow, Forced Medication of Legally Incompetent Prisoners:
A Primer, 30 SPG HUM. RTS. 3 (Spring 2003).
76. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 222.
77. Id. at 226 (finding the state prison policy to be a "rational means of
furthering the State's legitimate objectives").
78. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
79. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 166.
80. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135 (emphasis added).
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Riggins to attach a substantive label to the level of scrutiny applied,
8'
but lower courts have interpreted its standard to be at least
"heightened" scrutiny.
82
The rule announced in Sell to allow forced medication of a criminal
defendant for trial competency purposes bears many similarities to the
Riggins test. Justice Breyer used much of the same terminology as was
used in Riggins to determine the dangerousness standard, but certain
phrases in the case distinguish it. The opinion refers to the notion that
a dangerousness determination is more easily managed than one
involving trial competency.83  Also, forced medication due to
dangerousness must be "essential for the sake of [his] own safety or the
safety of others," where for trial competency it must be "substantially
likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial" as well as
"substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere
significantly with the defendants' ability to assist counsel.
8 5 This
shows a higher level of scrutiny in cases of trial competency than in
dangerousness cases because the government must show that the
medication is not only necessary to reach trial competency8 (similar to
the "dangerousness" standard), but also that the use of anti-psychotic
medication is not overinclusive
III. EFFECTS OF THE SELL DECISION
As described earlier, the Supreme Court has established levels of
judicial scrutiny for forced medication cases. Depending on the factual
situation, the government must clear a different-sized hurdle to satisfy
due process concerns.8 The level of scrutiny to justify a dangerousness
classification is lower than the Sell standard, but is that difference
significant enough to create incentives for prosecutors to classify a
81. Id. at 136.
82. See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
83. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 182. "The inquiry into whether medication is
permissible, say, to render an individual nondangerous is usually more 'objective
and manageable' than the inquiry into whether medication is permissible to render
a defendant competent." Id. (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140).
84. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
85. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
86. The medication must be "substantially likely to render the defendant
competent to stand trial." Id.
87. By requiring that the medication be "substantially unlikely to have side
effects..." the Court is creating a requirement that its use is not overinclusive.
88. See supra Part II.B.
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defendant differently or take another route to seek forcible
medication? In his majority opinion in Sell, Justice Breyer repeatedly
acknowledged there were "alternative grounds" by which a person
could be forcibly medicated apart from the trial competency issue. 89
The first example given was based on an individual's dangerousness. 90
The second was that of civil commitment and appointment of a
guardian.9
A. Potential Effects
According to the Sell majority opinion, "If a court authorizes
medication on these alternative grounds, dangerousness determination
or civil commitment, the need to consider authorization on trial
competence grounds will likely disappear. 92 It is unclear whether this
statement is simply a tautology, or an indication that the Court wishes
the government to pursue administrative rather than judicial solutions
to justify forced medication. Clearly, the identification of "alternative
grounds" by Justice Breyer makes Sell more than a civil rights decision.
Not only does it define a civil right of mentally ill criminal defendants,
it also will affect the way in which the government is required to treat
those defendants.93 Will it result in increased attempts to classify
mentally ill criminal defendants as a danger to themselves or others,
allowing medication on Harper-style grounds? Alternately, will it
result in increased use of the "alternative ground" of civil
commitment? Simple rational choice models, used in Law and
Economics analysis and extended by Public Choice Theory to
nonmarket situations, can help to hypothesize the future effects of the
Sell ruling.
1. Identifying the Incentives of Forced Medication Decision
Makers
To use Law and Economics modeling to determine the effects Sell
will have on future cases requires identification of the goals of the
three groups of actors involved in the process: prosecutors, mental
health professionals, and judges. Law and Economics literature is
89. Sell, 539 U.S. at 182.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Sell, 539 U.S. at 183.
93. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Rules Tightened on Forcibly Medicating
Defendants, 2 No. 24 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 4 (June 20, 2003) (on file with author).
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replete with analysis of the criminal courts9' and such analysis can be
applied to the prosecutors and judges making a decision whether to
forcibly medicate a criminal defendant. Briefs filed in the Sell case
provide a glimpse into the goals of a mental health professional
charged with helping make the determination. After discerning the
goals of each party, we can hypothesize the potential effects of Sell.
Public Choice Theory95 assumes that the three groups are rational
decision makers who seek to maximize their utility.96 With regard to
criminal prosecutors, Judge Easterbrook97 describes their goals as
"select[ing] the appropriate probability of conviction to complement
existing sentences in order to achieve optimal deterrence and reduce
expenditures in prosecution. '" 98 These goals of optimal deterrence and
reduced expenditures play a role in the prosecution of mentally ill
criminal defendants. The level of deterrence via prosecution is
difficult to pinpoint for the mentally ill as there is always a question of
whether they can truly be deterred from criminal acts by punishment,
and the prosecution of the mentally ill creates higher costs in the form
of competency hearings and the use of mental health professionals. 9
Judges have an interest in achieving the maximum deterrence at the
lowest possible cost.'O They also operate under time constraints due to
increased criminal dockets and pressure from legislators to hasten the
resolution of criminal trials.0  It has been suggested that judges
94. See generally William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14
J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure As a Market
System, 12 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 289 (1983); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21 (6th ed. 2003); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW
AND ECONOMICS 388-444 (4th ed. 2004).
95. Public Choice Theory, a branch of Law and Economics, is defined as "the
economic analysis of non-market decision making." NICHOLAS MERCURO &
STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-
MODERNISM 85 (1997).
96. Id.
97. Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook sits on the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and is a prominent Law and Economics scholar.
98. Easterbrook, supra note 94, at 305.
99. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (2000) (requiring use of one or more
psychologists or psychiatrists for competency hearing).
100. Easterbrook, supra note 94, at 331.
101. POSNER, supra note 94, at 580; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2000)
(known as the Speedy Trial Act). The Act establishes time limits for completing
the various stages of a federal criminal prosecution. The information or
indictment must be filed within thirty days from the date of arrest or service of the
summons. Id. § 3161(b). The trial must commence within seventy days from the
2005]
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"consciously adopt efficiency as a goal,' ' 0 2 and seek the use of clear
rules in order to reduce cases overturned on appeal and to expend less
time and energy deciding cases. 03
Mental health professionals also play a large role in the decision to
forcibly medicate a criminal defendant. Both psychologists and
psychiatrists can provide judges with information in a competency
hearing as to the defendant's mental status. °4 The primary goal of
both groups is appropriate treatment of the mentally ill,0 5 but their
briefs in the Sell case indicate that they differ strongly on the
appropriate methods of treatment.
The American Psychiatric Association fell squarely on the side of
the government in the Sell case.' It is their view that anti-psychotic
medications, especially the newer types, have a low risk of adverse
affects and are very effective in restoring competency for trial
purposes.'0 7 The American Psychological Association, on the other
hand, did not claim to support either party but clearly shaded towards
Dr. Sell's defensein Its view is that nondrug therapies should be
date the information or indictment was filed, or from the date the defendant
appears before an officer of the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is
later. Id. § 3161(c)(1).
102. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 94, at 440 ("It can be argued, for example,
that judges should allocate legal entitlements fairly and that the fair allocation has
no systematic connection to an efficient allocation. In spite of such arguments,
judges often prefer more efficient rules, but their own descriptions employ terms
other than 'efficiency."').
103. Cooter and Ulen posit that inefficient laws are litigated more than efficient
ones. Id. at 437.
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (2002) ("A psychiatric or psychological examination
ordered pursuant to this chapter shall be conducted by a licensed or certified
psychiatrist or psychologist, or, if the court finds it appropriate, by more than one
such examiner.").
105. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association at 1
("APA ... has a broader ethical and professional interest in ensuring that persons
with mental illness are treated in a humane and beneficial manner."); Brief for the
American Psychiatric Association and the American Academy of Psychiatry and
the Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at cover (members are
"dedicated to excellence in practice, teaching..."), Sell v. United States, 539 U.S.
166 (2003) (No. 02-5664).
106. Their brief was listed as "Supporting Respondent." Brief for American
Psychiatric Association at 1, Sell (No. 02-5664).
107. See id. at 16-19.
108. See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association, Sell (No.
02-5664).
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exhausted before involuntary administration of drugs is imposed on a
criminal defendant.1°9 As described in the analysis below, whether a
psychiatrist or a psychologist is providing the expert testimony will
likely affect the ruling of a judge under the Sell standard.
Now that the goals of each of the decision makers have been
identified, they can be applied to the options by which the government
prosecutors can attempt to forcibly medicate a criminal defendant.
The first is from a determination of dangerousness. The second is
under the trial competency standard of Sell. The third is the use of
alternate grounds explained by Justice Breyer in Sell." ° Given these
options by which to achieve forced medication, are prosecutors likely
to seek such a ruling in the courts in cases of mentally ill criminal
defendants?
2. Analysis of the Options for Forcible Medication
a. Dangerousness
If, as has been posited, " the Sell decision creates greater due process
protection for nondangerous criminal defendants than it does for
dangerous criminal defendants, prosecutors will seek to classify many
more defendants as dangerous in the hopes of bringing a greater
number of defendants to trial. Some critics have already opined that
the use of dangerousness as a basis for forcibly medicating individuals
can be problematic. "2 The Sell decision, described as a significant step
in the evolution of civil rights of the mentally ill,1 3 may change the way
prosecutors classify a defendant's mental state with dangerousness
becoming the focus instead of trial competency.
When presented with an incarcerated criminal defendant
incompetent to stand trial that is refusing anti-psychotic medication, a
prosecutor may call for another competency hearing in the hopes that
the defendant may be declared dangerous, and forcibly medicated
under the Riggins standard. As described previously,' 4 the secondary
109. Id. at 3.
110. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
111. See supra Part II.B.
112. Paul F. Stavis, Involuntary Hospitalization in the Modern Era: Is
"Dangerousness" Ambiguous or Obsolete? 41 NEW YORK QUALITY OF CARE
NEWSLETTER (N.Y. State Comm. on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled,
Schenectady, N.Y.), Aug.-Sep. 1989, available at http://www.cqc.state.ny.us/counsel
s corner/cc4l.htm. (last visited Feb. 1, 2004) (hard copy on file with author).
113. See Hudson, supra note 93.
114. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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effect of trial competency can be achieved. A review of Sell and other
cases indicates, however, that once the defendant is incarcerated, both
judges and mental health professionals are hesitant to make a
dangerousness determination. " 5 Knowledge of this fact will discourage
a prosecutor from seeking an additional hearing in hopes of a
dangerousness ruling, as the probability of success is low and
additional costs certain. When adding to this the fact that deterrence,
at least in the present case, is being effected (the defendant is already
incarcerated), there seems little incentive for a prosecutor to ask for an
additional competency hearing.
However, if the crime is a very serious one, there is a greater
incentive to deter future crimes of that sort. If a dangerousness ruling
does not seem feasible the prosecutor's only other choice is to seek
forcible medication under the standard set forth in Sell.
b. Forcible Medication Using the Sell Standard
When faced with a nondangerous (or presumed nondangerous)
mentally ill criminal defendant, a prosecutor now knows that he will
need to invoke the Sell standard to forcibly medicate. To determine if
he should pursue this end, a rational prosecutor will weigh the amount
of resources that the motion to medicate will require against the
probability that the motion will be successful. The costs of bringing
the motion and participating in the hearing are well known to the
prosecutor, but the probability of success is more difficult to calculate.
By examining the parts of the Sell test described earlier1 6 in light of
who will contribute to that decision-making process (mental health
professionals and judges), the probability of success in an individual
case will become clearer.
Although a judge will be applying the Sell test to the facts in a given
case, those facts will be supplied by the mental health professionals
that have examined the defendant. " 7 Judges rely heavily on the
opinions of these experts to help them understand a field that is not
115. See, e.g., United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 878-79 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
("There appears no basis to believe that Weston's worsening condition renders
him more dangerous given his near-total incapacitation."); see also Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. at 172 ("The reviewing psychiatrist added that he considered Sell
'dangerous based on threats and delusions if outside, but not necessarily in[side]
prison."') (quoting from the district court record).
116. See supra Part II.A.
117. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4247(c) (2000) (describing the contents of the
psychological or psychiatric reports to be submitted to a judge as part of a
competency hearing).
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their forte," 8 and they play an especially large role in a Sell
determination.
Three of the prongs of the Sell test pertain to conditions that are to
be gauged by mental health professionals. Whether the involuntary
medication is "medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have
side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking
account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary . . .""9 are questions
that will be answered by the experts. At this point a prosecutor would
be well suited to know whether the expert testifying will be a
psychiatrist or a psychologist, due to their different stances on anti-
psychotic medication.2 It is clear that a psychiatrist is more likely to
see anti-psychotic medication as "necessary" than a psychologist. So,
the rational prosecutor will need to find out which profession the
person examining the defendant belongs to in order to more accurately
determine the probability of success.
Even if a prosecutor feels confident that the expert will testify that
three prongs of the Sell test will be met with anti-psychotic medication,
there is one last hurdle to overcome: the judge must find important
governmental interests are at stake.121 The Sell opinion was not specific
as to the exact crimes that created an important interest.'22 That will be
determined by the judiciary as more Sell motions are heard. Until this
is clarified, prosecutors will be less able to calculate their chances of
success and thus less likely to bring a forcible medication motion under
the rule of Sell.
118. A psychiatrist who has testified at numerous trial competency hearings
explained that, at a great number of them, a judge would ask "Doc, what do I do?"
Telephone Interview with J. Rahn Sherman, M.D., Former Assistant Secretary of
Health and Human Services, State of Louisiana (Feb. 19, 2004) (on file with
author).
119. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.
120. See supra Part III.A.1.
121. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
122. Important interests can be shown when the offense is a "serious crime,"
either against persons or property. Id.; see also supra Part II.A.
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3. Is Civil Commitment Now Preferable for Forced Medication
Situations?
Justice Breyer's opinion also mentioned civil commitment 123 as
another option for a government body seeking to forcibly medicate a
criminal defendant:
For another thing, courts typically address involuntary medical
treatment as a civil matter, and justify it on these alternative,
Harper-type grounds. Every State provides avenues through
which, for example, a doctor or institution can seek
appointment of a guardian with the power to make a decision
authorizing medication-when in the best interests of a patient
who lacks the mental competence to make such a decision.'
24
a. Traditional Civil Commitment
Traditional involuntary civil commitment laws for persons with
mental illness exist in all states in the United States. 12 A comparison
of the states of Idaho 126 and Alabama 27 indicate similar statutory
forms. The prominent requirement in each is that the person who may
be committed must pose a danger to himself or others.2 8 Judging from
this, there is little difference between civil commitment and a judicial
determination of dangerousness. The fact that dangerousness is
required for civil commitment leaves us in the same position as with a
judicial dangerousness determination: both judges and mental health
professionals have been hesitant to declare an incarcerated mentally ill
defendant a danger to himself or others.2 1 Could there have been an
additional alternative to which Justice Breyer was referring?
123. Civil commitment is defined as "the authority of the state to civilly commit
an individual for care." Civil Commitment: Past, Present, Future, 64 NEW YORK
QUALITY OF CARE NEWSLETTER (N.Y. State Comm. on Quality of Care for the
Mentally Disabled, Schenectady, N.Y.), Aug.-Sep. 1995, available at http://www.
cqc.state.ny.us/counsels corner/cc64.htm. (last visited Feb. 1, 2004) (hard copy on
file with author).
124. Sell, 539 U.S. at 182.
125. See Civil Commitment: Past, Present, Future, supra note 123.
126. IDAHO CODE § 66-329 (2004).
127. ALA. CODE § 22-52-37 (2004).
128. See ALA. CODE § 66-329(2); see also ALA. CODE § 22-52-37(a)(7).
129. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
2005] Forced Medication of Criminal Defendants 253
b. Outpatient Commitment
Recently, another type of civil commitment has come to the fore.
State lawmakers in more than thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have created another means to medicate the mentally ill.130
Outpatient commitment differs from traditional civil commitment
because it is directed not only towards currently dangerous persons,
but also potentially dangerous persons. 3' Rather than confining a
mentally ill person, these laws require that the person in question take
anti-psychotic medication or face involuntary commitment. '32
While the early reviews of these laws were mixed," a recent report
on the status of New York's version of outpatient commitment, known
as Kendra's Law'3 has been mostly positive.'35 Increased participation
in case management as well as reduced incidence of hospitalization,
homelessness, arrest, and incarceration are cited as benefits of
outpatient commitment."' In the opinion of the New York State
Office of Mental Heath, this preventative method of medicating the
mentally ill is a less restrictive and more efficient way to reduce both
the costs of the mentally ill on society and the harm to liberty interests
caused by forcibly medicating citizens. Although not directly
addressed by the Sell court, the use of outpatient commitment could
serve to prevent many of these issues from arising by addressing
mental health before a crime is committed, therefore leaving the judge
out of the issue.
130. Involuntary Commitment Laws Controversial, CNN.com (May 20, 1999),
available at http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9905/20/outpatient.
commitment/index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2004) (hard copy on file with author).
131. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (2004) (also known as Kendra's Law).
132. Id.
133. See National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, Policy on Involuntary
Commitment and Court-ordered Treatment (October 7, 1995), available at
http://.www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Policy/Updates/Involuntary-Comm
itment_ AndCourtOrderedTreatment.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004)(hard copy
on file with author).
134. Kendra Smith was a girl pushed in front of the subway by a mentally ill
man who had not taken his medication. See Involuntary Commitment Laws
Controversial, supra note 130.
135. New York State Office of Mental Health, Kendra's Law: Interim Report on
the Status of Assisted Outpatient Treatment (Jan. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.omh.state.ny.us/omhweb/Kendra-web/interimreport/Outcomes.htm
(last visited May 11, 2005).
136. See id.
137. Id.
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B. Present Effects of the Sell Decision
Of the cases citing Sell thus far, two in particular discussed the Sell
decision, but only to distinguish the facts of the case at hand. In United
States v. Morin,"' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held the Sell
rule to be inapplicable in that specific case. 39 The court ruled that the
continued provision of anti-psychotic medication to a criminal
defendant was not a violation of the defendant's due process 
rights.1'4
Moreover, the detaining entity did not have an "affirmative duty to




In the case of United States v. Kourey,142 the district court found the
Sell rule to be inapplicable but used the reasoning of the Sell court to
guide its decision. 143  Because the record did not indicate an
administrative effort was used to attempt to medicate the defendant,
review of the case under the Sell standard was unnecessary.44
There are other cases, however, that relied on the Sell rule to make
their determination. In United States v. Miller,1 4 1 the government
sought to involuntarily medicate the defendant for trial competency
purposes. 4 6 The district court, employing the Sell criteria, held that the
defendant, who had been arrested on federal weapons charges outside
147
the Bush family estate in Maine, could not be forcibly medicated
because he presented no danger to the public and the government had
148
not shown an "important" interest in bringing the defendant to trial.
The lack of a "serious crime," which under the Sell standard would
implicate an important interest, 49 seems to be the guiding factor in
138. United States v. Morin, 338 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2003).
139. Id. at 843.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. United States v. Kourey, 276 F. Supp. 2d 580 (S.D.W.Va. 2003).
143. Id. at 581.
144. Id. at 585.
145. United States v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Me. 2003).
146. Id. at 164.
147. Norra MacReady, High Court Ruling Garners Praise, CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, VOL.31, ISSUE 7 (July 1, 2003), available at 2003 WL 15387184.
148. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 165.
149. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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most decisions which denied the government's requests to forcibly
medicate criminal defendants for trial competency9
In cases in which courts have authorized involuntary medication, the
seriousness of the alleged crime has also been the determinative factor.
United States v. Evans' provides a fitting example. The defendant,
who was alleged to have threatened a federal officer,"2 was jailed and
found incompetent to stand trial. 53 At the hearing to involuntarily
medicate the defendant the court found that he was not currently a
danger to himself or others. The government alternatively sought to
medicate the defendant for trial competency purposes. The court then
found that although the crime alleged to have been committed was
"serious,' 54 the "defendant's refusal to take medication voluntarily
could lead to a lengthy confinement in a mental institution . . . .
This led to the court's conclusion that even though the crime was
serious, there was not an "important governmental interest" in
prosecution.' However, at a second Sell competency hearing, the
court reversed the earlier decision, noting that since the defendant had
been charged in the interim with a felony, a serious crime had been
implicated and involuntary medication could now be administered.
157
The other cases since Sell in which involuntary medication was
authorized have made the seriousness of the crime the focal point of
the determination.
158
150. See United States v. Barajas-Torres, Crim. No. EP-03-CR-2011(KC), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13232, at *10 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 2004) (holding that the charge
of illegal reentry is not a serious crime for Sell purposes); United States v.
Dumeny, 295 F. Supp. 2d 131, 133 (D. Me. 2004) (finding a firearms possession
charge is not a serious crime for Sell purposes); see also United States v. Ghane,
392 F.3d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 2004) (using another Sell factor, likelihood of restoring
competence, to deny a request to involuntarily medicate).
151. United States v. Evans, 293 F. Supp. 2d 668 (W.D. Va. 2003), overruled by
United States v. Evans, Case No. 1:02CR00136, 1:04M00014, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4204 (W.D. Va. March 18, 2004).
152. Evans, 293 F. Supp. at 670.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 674. The judge used the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment
"serious crime" reasoning for jury trial determinations to determine what a serious
crime was in a Sell determination. Id.
155. Id. at 674.
156. Evans, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 674.
157. United States v. Evans, Case No. 1:02CR00136, 1:04M00014, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4204, at *5-6 (W.D. Va. March 18, 2004).
158. See United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding
possession of firearms by convicted felon is serious crime); United States v.
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IV. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SELL V. UNITED STATES
Now the possibilities are laid out for the government when seeking
to forcibly medicate an incarcerated criminal defendant who is
incompetent to stand trial and is refusing anti-psychotic medication.
They may seek a dangerousness determination, but when the
defendant is already incarcerated that ruling is unlikely to occur.19
They may seek medication of the nondangerous criminal defendant
under the Sell standard, but if the crime committed is not serious
enough for prosecution to be an important governmental interest, or
even if it is a close call,1'6 the costs of pursuing the medication likely
outweigh the probability of winning the motion. 61  The civil
commitment standard referred to in Sell also requires a finding of
dangerousness,16 and outpatient commitment seems to serve a163
prophylactic function rather than one to restore trial competency.
Sell has been read as many things: from a victory for the civil rights
of the mentally ill1" to a means for criminal defendants to delay their
trials by accepting, then refusing, mental health medication.
6
1
Viewpoints aside, the decision creates an unintended consequence that
may have been overlooked by the Supreme Court. By creating a
tangible distinction between forcible medication for dangerousness
and for trial competency, the Court widened an existing gap and left
many incarcerated mentally ill criminal defendants in a difficult
situation. For those who do not meet the dangerousness standard of
Harper and Riggins, and are alleged to have committed a crime for
which there is not an important governmental interest in prosecution,1
66
this right to refuse medication can backfire. While the altruistic goal of
protecting the rights of the mentally ill to such a degree that they can
refuse medication to make them competent to stand trial has been
achieved, it could result in situations in which a defendant will be
Mackie, No. 40-4392, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 25151 (December 7, 2004) (federal
firearms offense is serious crime); United States v. Kimball, No. CR03-1025, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26586 (March 23, 2004) (threatened attack on mass
transportation facility is serious crime).
159. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
160. Economists presume that most people (prosecutors included) are risk
averse. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 94, at 53.
161. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
162. See supra Part III.A.3.a.
163. See supra Part III.A.3.b.
164. See Hudson, supra note 93.
165. Sell, 539 U.S. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. See United States v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 2d 163, 164-65 (D. Me. 2003).
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incarcerated longer by refusing the medication than he would have had
he been brought to trial and convicted. 67 Sell himself 68 and quite
probably the defendant in the Miller case 169 find themselves examples
of this unintended consequence.
CONCLUSION
When viewed as a whole, one can see the evolution of the "liberty
interest" in the right to refuse involuntary medication. Harper defined
the "liberty interest.' 70  Riggins furthered those rights by
acknowledging that whether using a dangerousness argument or a trial
competency argument, the government was required to meet some
level of due process review.17' Sell raised the standard of review for
trial competency cases above those governing dangerousness
determinations. 172
What is the effect of this line of cases? Collectively, they have
clearly defined the burden the state bears in an attempt to medicate
mentally ill criminal defendants against their wishes, and have
attempted to guide those seeking such involuntary medication towards
"alternative grounds." The alternative ground of dangerousness is a
means to circumvent the standard set forth in Sell for involuntary
medication of nondangerous, mentally ill criminal defendants for trial
competency purposes, but it is unlikely that an incarcerated defendant
will be found dangerous.' 73  The alternative ground of civil
commitment is another option. Each state has laws that allow for
involuntary commitment, but the person at issue must pose a danger to
himself or others, as the Riggins standard requires. '74 The notion of
167. Brief for American Psychiatric Association at 25, Sell (No. 02-5664).
168. "Dr. Sell has been incarcerated for more than 4 years. That is longer than
the severest penalty he would have received had he gone to trial and been found
guilty." MacReady, supra note 147.
169. "If found guilty of possessing a firearm after being committed to a mental
institution, Miller would face only 18 months to two years in prison, said his
lawyer, Bruce Merrill. He has already been in custody since Sep[tember] 30,
2002." Judge Says Defendant Can't Be Forced to Take Medication, ASSOCIATED
PRESS WIRES (Nov. 12, 2003) (on file with author).
170. See supra Part I.A.
171. See supra Part I.B.
172. See supra Part II.B.
173. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
174. Id.
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outpatient commitment can now be considered another alternative.
175
While ostensibly to be used for prevention of societal problems caused
by those with mental illness, outpatient commitment could be used to
medicate those released on bail between their arrest and trial.
It appears that Sell and its progeny do reflect an effort to protect the
civil rights of the mentally ill when they choose to decline anti-
psychotic medication. And, the less dangerous a person is, the better
his chances of being allowed to refuse that medication. However, the
unintended consequence created by recognition of this "liberty
interest" cannot go unnoticed.
1 76
Perhaps the best way to view the Sell decision is not as a civil rights
decision but rather as an issue that the Court sees as a medical and
societal, rather than a judicial, problem. By creating rules which make
it more difficult to forcibly medicate nondangerous mentally ill
criminal defendants, the Supreme Court has created incentives to use
alternative grounds, reducing the role of judge as mental health
professional.
Does the Sell ruling increase the civil rights of nondangerous,
mentally ill criminal defendants? Yes. Will this decision lead to the
increased use by the government of the dangerousness tag? Law and
Economics modeling, as well as previous judicial dangerousness
determinations, seem to indicate not. 77 The Sell ruling extended a gap
between medication for dangerousness and medication for trial
competency into which many mentally ill criminal defendants that
refuse mental health medication will fall. Will this decision lead to the
increased use of civil commitment? It will not under the traditional
form of civil commitment, but there is hope that outpatient
commitment will have a prophylactic effect.'78 Unfortunately, it seems
that granting the right to refuse mental health medication to mentally
ill criminal defendants may mean longer incarceration, and a net loss,
for those who opt to invoke it. Clearly, this is an unintended, and
unfortunate, consequence of Sell v. United States.
175. See supra Part III.A.3.b.
176. See supra Part IV.
177. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
178. See supra Part III.A.3.b.
